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Th e procurement of defense material can be regarded, fi rst, as a selfevident technical process in a security environment or, secondly, as an economic policy measure that is part of a government's fi scal framework. Th e fi rst approach is obviously of vital importance for evaluating the military effi ciency of defense material. However, if we want to understand why certain armaments are procured, we also have to take a closer look at the second aspect. From the very beginning, procurement of armaments has been infl uenced by various fi elds of politics. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the main fi elds of government involvement include foreign and security policy, home aff airs, fi scal policy as well as economic, foreign trade, and regional policy. Of course, military factors also matter, but they have oft en been subordinated to "civilian" aff airs. Another aspect of the period under review was the particular situation surrounding Germany. As it triggered and lost World War II, the Federal government, amidst reconstruction, was concerned to integrate the country into the Western alliance in order to achieve true sovereignty in foreign policy matters. dieter h. kollmer 3 For a basic work on the problems of fi nancing the military in Germany, see Lutz Koellner, Militär und Finanzen. Zur Finanzgeschichte und Finanzsoziologie von Militaerausgaben in Deutschland (Munich: Bernard und Graefe, 1982) . For useful background to the special situation in the Federal Republic in the build-up phase of the Bundeswehr, see Werner Abelshauser, "Wirtschaft und Rüstung in den fünfziger Jahren, " in Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945 -1956 Peace, 1956 -1961 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965 In early 1955, when the decision was fi nalized that the Federal Republic of Germany would establish its own armed forces within the framework of NATO, it became quickly obvious that one of the toughest problems would be to quickly and effi ciently provide the major items of equipment for Germany's defense-namely, tanks, aircraft and warships.
3 Th ere were several reasons for Germany's diffi cult position of the time. First were the fundamental economic issues of budgeting and adapting the national economy, which were essential if Germany wanted to keep the promise to the alliance to stand up a military force of 500,000 men in the shortest possible time. Another reason was the lack of essential knowledge. In the years following the Second World War, Germany lacked the know-how to build the latest weapons, and German industry was, on the whole, poorly prepared to begin renewed arms production. It would all be very expensive. Th e Federal Republic wanted to build its own armed forces-but not at any price. Th e Germans faced some further daunting problems that illustrate the complexity of creating a conventional military of a half million men from virtually nothing. Yet this force was needed to contribute to the defense of freedom and democracy right on the front line of the border separating east and west. To carry out this mission required the creation of a new and elaborate procurement system. Yet there were factors unique to Germany that also inhibited the development of a true military-industrial complex on the model of the Americans.
